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The Right to Swing?
Introduction
In Labaye v. the Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada recently held that the
activities occurring inside a Montreal swingers club do not qualify as indecent.1
Undoubtedly speaking for many, the Globe and Mail, the country’s most popular
newspaper, claimed that the decision made “no sense,” noting “You don’t need to be a
fuddy-duddy to cringe at the Supreme Court’s libertarianism.”2
Labaye is an incredibly significant case and raises important issues about the
power of governments to prohibit morally offensive conduct.

Although I concur with

the judgment in the case, the Court’s shift from a community standards test for indecency
to one based on harm solely on harm is puzzling. Labaye is inconsistent with many of
the court’s previous rulings, and as a practical matter, may have abolished the crime of
indecency all together. The decision also leaves the constitutional status of swingers
clubs (and the acts that occur therein) unresolved. If such establishments are not
indecent, can they be outlawed on other grounds? What type of regulations can be placed
on them? Labaye suggests that the fact a society finds a particular practice morally
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repugnant is not a legitimate reason to prohibit it. Does this mean that morality laws3 in
general are suspect?
In this article, I will argue that individuals have a fundamental right to participate
in private sexual relations of their choosing without interference from the state. As the
United States Supreme Court has held, there is “an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex.”4 I contend that the conduct at issue in Labaye is protected
under the liberty provision of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 and that the moral
offensiveness of the conduct does not justify criminal prosecution. Restrictions might be
placed on swinger clubs in so far as they pose a nuisance or bring about so-called
secondary effects,6 but the mere moral disapproval of swinging is not a strong enough
interest7 under section 1 of the Charter to justify infringing the rights of the participants.
Indeed, it is not for the state to assess the propriety of private sexual behavior among
consenting adults.
Under the approach I advance, we need not say that only harmful conduct can be
prohibited. This claim, which lurks in the background of Labaye, has some appeal but
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has been rejected by Canada’s Supreme Court.8 The Court cited cannibalism, bestiality,
and cruelty to animals as examples of crimes that rest on their offensiveness to social
values as opposed to the harm they might cause.9 The reason sexual conduct like
swinging cannot be prohibited is because it falls within the “irreducible sphere of
personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free from
state interference.”10 There may be legitimate reasons to regulate the conduct of swingers
in certain instances. However, as a general matter, the state is not justified in interfering
in the intimate relations of consenting adults, and the Court should have made this plain
in Labaye.

Labaye v. The Queen
Labaye was the owner of club Orage in Montreal.11 The club’s purpose was to
facilitate group sex among its members (and their invited guests). 12 Members paid an
annual fee, and no one was permitted to join the club unless he/she expressed both
knowledge of the nature of the club and shared the club’s views on group sex.13 A
doorman manned the main door to ensure that only members and their guests could
enter.14 The club was three floors in all, and group sex occurred only on the third floor.15
The two lower floors contained a bar and a salon, but no one was ever paid for sex.16
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The owner of Orage, Jean - Paul Labaye, was convicted of keeping a
“common bawdy house for the practices of acts of indecency” under s.210(1) of the
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.V. 1985, c. - 46.17 The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction, holding that swinging was not indecent under Canadian law.18
In quashing the conviction, the majority defines an indecent act as one that
“causes harm or presents a significant risk of harm to individuals or society in a way that
undermines or threatens to undermine a value reflected in and thus formally endorsed
through the Constitution or similar fundamental laws.”19 It cites as examples conduct
that infringes the autonomy of others, predisposes others to anti-social behavior or
physically or psychologically hurts participants.20 In the Supreme Court’s view, the harm
must also be “of a degree that is incompatible with the proper functioning of society.”21
The dissent charges that the Court has replaced the community standards test of tolerance
(i.e. what the community would tolerate others doing) with a test that looks solely at
harm.22
The dissent overstates the point slightly. While it is true that the Court rejects the
community standards test and views it as too subjective23, the majority is explicit that
“[i]ndeceny connotes sexual mores.”24 Thus to be indecent, conduct must be harmful,
and also violate sexual mores. Although the majority could have been much clearer on
this point, the harm test is best understood as particularly demanding application of
15
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community standards. Under Labaye, conduct is indecent if it offends prevailing sexual
mores, but the fact-finder does not rely solely on his own nebulous concept of community
standards to determine whether a violation has taken place. Rather, the sexual conduct at
issue must be objectively offensive, and the only sexual conduct that is objectively
offensive, according to the Supreme Court, is sexual conduct that offends a fundamental
value of Canadian society by, for example, infringing the autonomy of others or
predisposing citizens to anti-social behavior.25
In seeking to give objective content to indecency, Canada’s Supreme Court
divorces indecency from morality. Since Canada is a pluralistic society, offending the
moral views of some group of people is not enough to make the conduct objectively
harmful.26 An act might not be indecent even if the majority of society finds it morally
repugnant.27

This narrow view of harm - along with the Court’s demand that the

allegedly indecent activity must be “incompatible with the proper functioning of
society”28 sets a very high bar for future prosecutions for indecency. Society has to
tolerate all morally offensive sexual conduct that falls short of bringing about social
disorder.29
It is an open question whether previous indecency cases are compatible with
Labaye. In Mara, for example, the manager and owner of an exotic dancing
establishment were charged with allowing indecent performances.30 The establishment’s
dancers provided “lap dances” for a fee, and customers could fondle the breasts and
25
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genitalia of the nude dancers.31 The Supreme Court found this conduct indecent,
reasoning that it both demeaned and objectified women. The Court wrote, “[This
conduct] dehumanizes and desensitizes sexuality and is incompatible with the recognition
of the dignity and equality of each human being.”32 The concerns cited here do constitute
“harm” under the Labaye framework.33 However, it is important to note how the Court
came to its conclusion in Mara. It did not, for example, look at empirical data that
suggested a connection between exotic-dancing establishments and the way women are
perceived by society as a whole. Rather, it simply noted the community standards were
exceeded as evidenced by the fact that Toronto had recently passed a by-law prohibiting
contact between adult entertainers and their customers.34
The equality between the genders issue was specifically taken up in Labaye and
discounted because of the government’s inability to produce evidence of anti-social
attitudes towards women produced by swinging.35 This is a dramatic departure from
Mara as the burden is now on the government to prove that the offending conduct is truly
harmful. As the Court stated in Labaye: “Vague generalizations that the sexual conduct
at issue will lead to attitudinal changes and hence anti-social behavior will not suffice . . .
The Crown must establish a real risk that the way people live will be significantly and
adversely affected by this conduct.”36 To prosecute swinging as indecency the state must
show that swinging poses a significant risk of harm to society (by demeaning women for
example), and that this harm would have to be of a degree that is “incompatible with the
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proper functioning of society”37 It is questionable whether the state could ever meet this
high burden, raising doubts not only about Mara but Queen v. Butler, another significant
indecency case. 38
One possible way to distinguish Labaye from Mara is that in the former the
establishment at issue is a “public tavern”39 whereas, as the majority emphasizes, the
swingers club in Labaye is private.40 Of course, there is no fine line between “public”
and “private” places.41 The swingers club in Labaye, for example, was not open to the
general public, but it did advertise in periodicals and was located in a commercial
building. All that was necessary to join was a small fee and a short interview.42 In any
case, why should it matter that Mara involves a public tavern whereas Labaye involves a
private club? Activities in private establishments can be just as indecent (i.e. harmful) as
activities in public ones. In Labaye, the Court found no evidence of harm because the
only ones exposed to the goings-on inside the club were already predisposed to
swinging.43 Similarly, the only ones exposed to the lap dances in Mara were the
establishment’s patrons who were presumably there for the purpose of being titillated by
37
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nude women. If regular exotic dancing is permissible, how could the additional exposure
to lap dances significantly exacerbate the harm to willing spectators and participants, let
alone cause harm to a degree that is “incompatible with the proper functioning of
society”?44
The crucial difference between Mara and Labaye in my view is that in the former
the participants were paying individuals to have sexual relations with them. The fact that
money is involved does not make an act more indecent, however, and Mara does not
suggest otherwise.45 Society would not be harmed any less - and the acts would be no
less indecent in Mara - if the dancers allowed themselves to be groped for free. What the
commercialization of sexual conduct does do is waive any constitutional protection the
conduct may enjoy. “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct,”46 and sex for money (whether
in a bar or a private residence) is a commercial transaction, not intimate conduct.47 Thus,
the state can, if it chooses, prosecute lap-dancing as criminally indecent. Labaye,
unfortunately, does not address whether the right to engage in the sexual relations of
one’s choice is protected under section 7 of the Charter, suggesting that sexual conduct
by adults in a private residence may merit no more protection than the lap-dances in
Mara.
If the Supreme Court of Canada is correct, criminal indecency necessarily
involves some harm.48 However, the Court held previously in Malmo-Levine49 that harm
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was not a prerequisite for criminalization: “[W]e do not think there is a consensus that
the harm principle is the sole justification for criminal prohibition . . . . The state may
sometimes be justified in criminalizing conduct that is either not harmful (in the sense
contemplated by the harm principle) or that causes harm only to the accused.”50 How to
reconcile these two decisions? Malmo-Levine seems to allow the state to prohibit
objectionable conduct such as swinging, but as limited by Labaye, prevents it from
prosecuting such conduct for violating subjective standards of indecency. If this
interpretation is correct, legislators, may, if they choose, criminalize conduct like
swinging, but they must do so directly. This makes sense because of the Supreme
Court’s concern in Labaye that juries and judges were merely expressing their personal
preferences and not truly speaking for the community in criminal indecency cases.51
Labaye therefore leaves the status of swinger clubs to the legislature. Legislatures
can either overturn the Court’s decision via the notwithstanding clause of the Canadian
Constitution52 or could enact a specific statute targeting swinging. While I do not deny
that the lawmakers can regulate swinger establishments, I do not believe that the clubs
such as the one at issue in Labaye can be prohibited and next I will turn to why this is so.

The Right to Sexual Liberty
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Under Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, every person “has the
right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”53 The Supreme Court
of Canada has consistently held that “liberty” is more than freedom from physical
restraint and should be interpreted broadly.54 In Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan
Toronto, it declared, “In a free and democratic society, the individual must be left room
for personal autonomy, to live his or her own life and to make decisions that are of
fundamental personal importance.”55 Individuals do not have an unbridled freedom to do
whatever they please, but they have a right to make fundamental personal decisions
without interference from the state.56 The Court has held that section 7 allows a person to
choose medical treatment for his/her child,57 loiter in a public place,58 and decide where
to establish his/her home.59
Whereas Canada protects individual autonomy through section 7’s liberty
provision, the United States Constitution protects individual autonomy as a matter of
substantive due process. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Casey, “At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”60 The European Convention on Human
Rights similarly guarantees individuals “respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence,” and public authorities can only encroach when the public good
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demands it.61 Regardless of the precise formulation, there are some decisions - personal
and private in nature - that individuals are entitled to make without interference from the
state, even if the state is able to assert a strong reason to intervene.62
Whether to swing - or indeed engage in any other kind of private consensual
sexual conduct - is increasingly recognized as the type of decision that must be left to the
individual. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has never held that the right to liberty
entails the right to have the private sexual relations of one’s choosing, the European
Court of Human Rights made clear in the Dudgeon case that this is precisely the type of
highly personal and intimate decision that goes to the core of personhood.63 Although
the Court recognized that the state had a strong interest in fostering public morality, the
state could not prohibit Mr. Dudgeon from engaging in sexual acts with consenting male
partners.64 Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court reversed an
earlier precedent65 and concluded that individuals had a right to engage in sodomy as
matter of due process even if the state found such acts deviant.66 The Court took note of
trends within the United States as well as internationally and concluded that there is an
“emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”67 Justice Stevens made
this point years earlier in his dissent to Bowers (adopted by the Court in Lawrence) when
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he wrote that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause protects personals decisions with
regards “the intimacies of [the] physical relationship.”68
We should not read Lawrence or Dudgeon to mean that people should feel free to
pursue their sexual proclivities wherever they happen to take them. Certainly there is no
constitutional objection to banning practices such as bestiality and necrophilia, no matter
how much this happens to impact individuals interested in these activities. The reason
that such prohibitions are permissible, however, is not that these individuals’ behavior
runs afoul of contemporary sexual mores. The fact that a given community morally
disapproves of necrophilia and bestiality is irrelevant to the question of whether such
behavior can be criminalized. Rather, these activities can be prohibited because society
does not recognize the claims of those engaged in such activities as implicating
individual autonomy. Choosing to couple with another consenting adult is an altogether
different decision than choosing to sexually impose oneself on an animal or cadaver.
Even those who are morally opposed to homosexuality must concede that the decision to
engage in such activity goes to the core of individual autonomy. (Indeed, the claim that
some opponents of homosexuality make is that homosexuals should choose
heterosexuality, not that they should not be free to choose their sexual partners). The right
to copulate with other consenting men and women, or not to do so, is important to
everyone - even if there is moral disapproval of how some individuals exercise this right.
Necrophilia only implicates the individual autonomy of necrophiliacs.
Sexual liberty, therefore, does not protect all conduct that can be loosely classified
as ‘pertaining to sex.’ Rather, individuals have a right to make fundamental decisions
about sex that go to the core of personal autonomy. This is the message of Lawrence.
68
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Canada & Sexual Liberty

In Labaye, Canada’s Supreme Court missed a valuable opportunity to determine
what, if any, constitutional protection sex has under Canada’s constitution. 69 Does the
right to liberty allow one to make private decisions about sex? How far does this liberty
extend? If the Court had confronted these questions, it might have resolved the status of
swinger clubs without drastically redefining indecency law.
At least one Canadian court has recognized that the right to sexual liberty is
within the ambit of section 7. In 2001, Prince Edward Island’s Supreme Court ruled that
the right to liberty protects a doctor’s sexual relationship with his patient, when their
relationship did not begin until several years after their professional relationship
terminated.70 The province’s high court noted that section 7 is premised on a respect for
individual autonomy, and if choosing where to establish one’s home is a quintessentially
private matter, then choosing with whom to establish a sexual relationship in that home
must be one as well.71 The court did not deny that the state had legitimate reasons to
prohibit intimate doctor/patient relations, but this rationale did not justify infringing the
rights of the doctor in this case.72

As the Canadian Supreme Court has said, “[T]he
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rights protected by s. 7 - life, liberty, and security of the person - are very significant and
cannot ordinarily be overridden by competing social interests.”73
In Mussani, the Ontario Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to Ontario’s ban on
doctor/patient relationships without ruling on the section 7 issue.74 A key difference
between this case and the Prince Edward Island one is that the Ontario code only bans
sexual relations with current patients.75 Nevertheless, the court conceded, “[T]he
argument that the liberty interest guarantees a general right to choose one's consensual
sex partner, on fundamental life choice grounds, is an intriguing one” before ultimately
deciding that this right was not implicated in the case because of the fundamentally
exploitative nature of the relationship at issue.76 What is noteworthy, however, is that the
Ontario Court of Appeals, like Prince Edward Island’s Supreme Court was open to the
idea that there might be a right under section 7 to have private consensual sex. This is
not to say that the right is absolute - and the right would not be implicated in cases of
coercive sex like Mussani. But the idea that the right to liberty protects an individual’s
consensual sexual relationships from the intrusion of the state is found in both domestic
and international law and provides a better ground for the judgment in Labaye.

Liberty to Swing?
One can accept that there is a fundamental right to have private consensual sexual
relations with the person of one’s choosing without necessarily extending constitutional
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protection to swinging. Labaye involved group sex, where individuals would often be
engaged in sex with multiple partners while others stood and watched.77 While there has
not been a plethora of cases dealing with group sex, some courts have been unwilling to
extend constitutional protection to such conduct. In Lovisi v. Slayton, the 4th Circuit held
that while the U.S. Constitution protects a married couple’s private acts of sexual
intimacy, once the couple admits strangers as onlookers (or participants) the acts lose
constitutional protection.78 The Fourth Circuit noted: “If the couple performs sexual acts
for the excitation or gratification of welcome onlookers, they cannot selectively claim
that the state is an intruder.”79 The court concluded that it was irrelevant whether the
audience is one, fifty, or one hundred - the acts could not truly be considered private.80
Lovisi was not the Fourth Circuit’s finest hour. First, the liberty interest at issue is
defined exceedingly narrowly. The court was not prepared to grant that individuals have
a right to engage in private consensual sex without interference from the state. Rather,
the Lovisis’ intimacies were protected only in so far as the acts took place within the
privacy of their marriage.81 Although its position was explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Eisenstadt, the 4th Circuit’s decision was premised on the view that married
couples were entitled to greater protection than single individuals.82 Given that the 4th
Circuit was not prepared to recognize the right of non-married individuals to engage in
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consensual sexual relations, it is not surprising that it did not recognize the right of a
couple to engage in sexual relations with a third party.
Perhaps more importantly, the distinction between public and private in Lovisi
makes little sense. If the presence of a third person in the bedroom is sufficient to make
sex public - or at least sufficiently public to allow for intervention from the state - does
the presence of a third person in a home make the home a public place? It would be
strange indeed if authorities could invade a home whenever they suspected the home’s
occupants had company. Moreover, as Lior Strahilevitz has pointed out, the presence of
a second person in the room for privacy purposes is just as problematic as the presence of
a third,83 and outside of Stanley v. Georgia,84 sexual gratification always involves the
presence of a stranger in the room.85 Lawrence, notably, allows adult persons to decide
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex without placing definite
limits on the kind of sex people can have. 86 This is not to say that individuals are free to
engage in sexual relations wherever and whenever they wish, and I will attempt to draw
some limits in the subsequent sections. However, sex does not necessarily cease to be
private when more than two individuals are involved. As the dissent properly concluded
in Lovisi: “[T]he nature and kind of consensual sexual intimacy is beyond the power of
the state to regulate or even to inquire.”87
The European Court of Human Rights faced a very similar case to Lovisi in A.D.T
v. United Kingdom,88 where five men were charged with gross indecency for engaging in
83
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oral sex with each other in a private home.89 Much as the court did in Lovisi, the United
Kingdom (the defendant in the case) attempted to draw a distinction between intimate,
private, and “acceptable” homosexual activity between two men and unacceptable
“public” activity (sex between more than two men).90 The court rejected the United
Kingdom’s argument, reasoning that the activity was still private because it was between
a restricted group of friends, where it was unlikely that outsiders would become aware
what was going on.91 The court’s approach, which focuses on the likelihood of public
exposure to the activity is far preferable to the Lovisi’s arbitrary rule that only sex
between two people merits constitutional protection.

Private Sex and Public Effects
Lawrence, A.D.T., and Dudgeon all recognize that individuals have a right to
engage in intimate sexual relations with other consenting adults. The problem, expressed
quite well in A.D.T., is that at some point the government may legitimately interfere with
the sexual relations of its citizens, but there is no clear answer as to when that may be. 92
Perhaps not when a “stranger” joins a married couple in their bedroom,93 but surely
Justice Scalia is right to suggest that were a group to rent out a coliseum for the purposes
of having an orgy, this would not be mere “private” behavior with which the state could
not involve itself.94
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Justice Scalia’s example is of limited use. Private clubs can have thousands of
members, and this does not make them public. Surely Neo-Nazis can rent out a large
auditorium to hold a rally, and the mere size of their group does not turn the auditorium
into a public commons, where others (racism opponents, for example) must be permitted
to enter.95 Sex in a private home or even a rented coliseum cannot be equated to sex in a
public park or on the White house lawn.
Even if one grants that a coliseum is a private venue being rented for the purpose
of facilitating private sexual activity, there is a natural trepidation to say that the sexual
conduct that occurs therein is purely private behavior. Why is this? I submit it is not
because the presence of multiple people is a license for the state to enter. Groups can
expect privacy against outsiders while not expecting it with respect to insiders.96 Rather,
a massive orgy in a coliseum is likely to expose non-participants to something they would
rather not see whereas there is little danger of this in a case like A.D.T. Scalia’s example
demonstrates only that when numerous participants are involved there is more likely
going to be an effect on the public. As I will explain in the next section, the state has a
strong interest in regulating private sex when it produces a nuisance, but this does not
mean that sex is always the state’s business.
Whether sex is private depends on the context in which it occurs, not its effect on
the public.97 In Clark, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to determine whether a
man’s home transformed into a public place when his neighbors observed him
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masturbating through an uncovered window in his living room.98 It is uncontroversial
that if the man had not been observed, there would have been no crime - this was a
private act undertaken in a private home. The Court’s holding was that because the
neighbors lacked physical access to the premises, the mere existence of spectators did not
transform his home into a public space.99 Although he still could be liable if he
knowingly exposed himself to his neighbors from his private property, Clark was not
guilty of being lewd in a public place.100 Clark is noteworthy because of the Court’s
recognition that acts undertaken in private places do not become “public” merely because
they have public effects.101
Why is this distinction important? Liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.102 By
blurring the line between public and private, the state is able to encroach on the intimate
decisions of individuals that would seemingly be protected. The better approach suggested by the Canadian Supreme Court in Clark and again in Labaye - is that when
the general public cannot enter, sex retains its private character.103 The question of
effects is a separate matter.

Regulating Sex: Nuisance and Secondary Effects
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The common law has long distinguished between visible sexual conduct and
conduct that takes place behind closed doors.104 Private property gives the owner nearly
absolute rights to exclude outsiders,105 and one has a reasonable expectation of sexual
privacy in one’s home or club which he/she does not have when copulating on the steps
of city hall. The individual loses his right to be “let alone”106 when he engages in sexual
activity in public. In Lawrence and ADT, the sex occurred in private residences. In
Labaye, it was a private club where no one was permitted to enter unless they were with a
member and approved of the swinging lifestyle.107 As the Supreme Court of Georgia has
held: “Adults who withdraw from public gaze to engage in private unforced sexual
behavior are exercising a right embraced within the right of personal liberty”108
Nevertheless, constitutional protection does not extend to all conduct that relates
to sex. As previously discussed, there is no right to pay for sex, for example. This is not
because sex between a prostitute and her customer is always “public,” but because
commercial transactions do not implicate individual autonomy or personhood to the same
degree that decisions relating to marriage, procreation, and a like do.109 Just as the state
can more easily regulate commercial speech than other kinds of speech,110 it can regulate
commercial sex more easily than non-commercial sex. Consenting individuals engaged
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in private non-commercial sex have a presumptive right to engage in this conduct without
the intervention of the government.111
The right to be free from state interference in one’s sexual life is not absolute.112
One does not lose the right when there is a ‘stranger in the room’ or when sex happens to
involve multiple parties, but sexual liberty does not give one license to create a nuisance.
Joel Feinberg writes, “[N]ude bodies and copulating couples, like all forms of nuisances,
have the power of preempting the attention and absorbing the reluctant viewer, whatever
his preference in the matter.”113 Mere moral disapproval of a sex act is not sufficient to
prohibit individuals from engaging in it on nuisance grounds, however. As Richard
Epstein explains with regards nuisance law in general, "[T]he abstract sense of being
offended that certain activities are being conducted in one's own neighborhood" is
"generally given little weight." 114 The state is only justified in intervening when third
parties can perceive, with their own senses, the sexual conduct.115 Seeing a sex act
imposes a discrete harm on non-consenting adults, to say nothing of children.116
This is not to say that a person does not suffer harm when behavior he/she finds
morally objectionable takes place in society. However, the harm is certainly greater
when he/she actually perceives it. Society regards the woman walking down the street
who is flashed by a man wearing only a trench coat as a victim - it does not regard
someone who merely knows that another stranger has been flashed as a victim in the
same way.117 Knowing that swinging takes place in Montreal is a far cry from hearing
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the grunts and groans emitted from a swingers club. The former is simply too abstract a
harm to be actionable. As Nagle explains:
“The simple awareness that a neighbor is engaged in activities that one
regards as immoral does not support a nuisance claim. There is
undoubtedly a sense in which one can be bothered by the knowledge that
your neighbor is living with an unmarried partner, rooting for the Mets, or
voting for Ralph Nader. But any offense that one takes from that
knowledge is not actionable.”118
Were it otherwise, a person could be guilty of creating a nuisance merely because
someone across town objects to his/her sexual practices.
One grounds for regulating sex, therefore, is when it causes a nuisance. In
Labaye, there was no record of neighbors being exposed to sexual conduct from inside
the club.119 It would be within the state’s power, however, to legislate that such clubs
have soundproofing or opaque windows. The state might also wish to ensure that no
swinger clubs are in an area where there are a great number of children. Such regulations
reasonably take into account the interests of the community without unduly burdening the
right of swingers and can be readily justified under section 1 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.120
Another reason to regulate sex is when it produces so-called “secondary effects”;
cities can regulate conduct that is constitutionally protected if their aim is to alleviate the
blight brought about by such conduct. 121 In Renton, for example, the Supreme Court
upheld a zoning regulation that targeted adult theaters because the ordinance was not
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intended to suppress speech but to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain
property values, and generally protect and preserve the quality of the city's
neighborhoods.122 If it could be shown that swingers clubs and other such establishments
bring increased criminal activity, then the state could justifiably prohibit them from
certain areas, but the burden would be on the state to prove that a causal link exists. In
Renton, for example, the Court noted the existence of ample studies with detailed
findings that proved the negative economic effects of adult movie theaters.123 The end
result of the secondary effects test might well be that swingers clubs can be prohibited in
one part of city but not another. Because of the liberty interest at stake, however, the
state cannot ban swinging entirely just as it cannot ban adult movies entirely.124
The Supreme Court of Canada in Labaye did not consider whether swingers clubs
could be a potential nuisance or a source of secondary effects. Instead it attempted to
discern whether swinging was indecent per se by producing harm “incompatible with the
proper functioning of society.”125 This narrow focus led the Court to avoid interesting
issues such as whether the proliferation of swingers clubs might lead to more sexually
transmitted diseases.126 Such questions might not be crucial to a ‘community standards’
view of indecency, but once the court shifted to a theory of indecency as harm, it is not
clear why it did not undertake an in-depth analysis of this particular establishment’s
effect on the neighboring community.
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The character of a swinging establishment and its effect on the surrounding
community should be a crucial part of any inquiry into the state’s right to regulate. The
Supreme Court of Canada in Labaye did not conduct such an inquiry. Having found that
swinging does not inevitably produce harm - except perhaps harm to moral sensibilities,
which the Court suggests is too abstract and subjective to count - it overturned Mr.
Labaye’s conviction for criminal indecency. While this was the right result, the state has
no business judging propriety of private consensual sexual conduct. A proper analysis of
the facts of Labaye would have given due consideration to the individual liberties of
those engaged in swinging while addressing the impact of swinger clubs on their
communities. The Court’s decision does neither and ultimately leaves the status of clubs
like Orage (and the conduct that occurs therein) unresolved.

Conclusion
In Labaye, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that there are no clear
“community standards” to judge conduct such as swinging. In the Court’s view, even if a
majority of persons in a given society finds particular conduct morally repugnant, this is
not sufficient reason to regard it as indecent. After Labaye, it is not clear what is left of
indecency law in Canada, and the decision calls into question several earlier precedents.
Nevertheless, Labaye should not be read so broadly as to suggest that only
conduct that runs afoul of the harm principle can be prohibited. Morals legislation that
does not implicate individual autonomy is different from legislation that does and under
Canadian law, moral considerations alone may be sufficient to prohibit some conduct, but
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not swinging apparently (under the rubric of indecency at least). Unfortunately, the
Court never delineates the limits of state power. Does the state have any business
criminalizing the private, consensual sexual conduct of its citizens? The prevailing view
in both the United States and Europe seems to be no. Of course, it is possible that
Canada’s Supreme Court would side with those who believe that there is no right to
sexual liberty, only, perhaps, a right to couple with one’s spouse.127 The Court treated
Labaye as a mere indecency case and offered few clues as to its thinking.
In this article, I have argued that personal decisions related to sex fall within the
“irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently
private choices free from state interference”128 and are protected under section 7 of the
Charter. Canada’s Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the individual must be
left room to live his or her own life and to make decisions that are of fundamental
personal importance,129 and few decisions are of more importance than how to order
one’s sexual life with others. This does not mean that swingers clubs and other sex
establishments are immune from governmental scrutiny. These clubs lose constitutional
protection if they deal in sex. Moreover, if such establishments pose a nuisance and
bring about blight and other secondary effects, then the state has a right to craft
reasonable regulations in response. But the Court in Labaye erred in not recognizing that
swinging, like sodomy and other sexual activity, should be within the liberty of
Canadians to choose, and the state cannot castigate such conduct as criminally indecent.
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Even if we disagree with the sexual decisions our fellow citizens make, this does not
mean that we have the right to prevent them from making them.
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